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THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR 
BY 
VALERIE KAMPH TAYLOR 
A TH.ES IS SUR.M.ITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
F~QUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAl\JD 
1975 
THESIS ABS TR.Z\CT 
This study will critically examine the moral p~ilosophy of one of 
existentialism's leading exponents I s i.rnone de Beauvoir, as set fortl1 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity. The problem of . the . nature and status of 
moral values and moral imperatives arises in Beauvoir ' s ethi8s when she 
denies the existence of objective moral values. The questions are: 
Why does Beauvoir deny objective values? How does Beauvoir understand 
the concept of objective values? And, finally, does Beauvoir actually 
succeed in 11,er attempt to offer an ethical philosophy ~n spite of her 
denial of objective values? 
In the Introduction, the distinction between hypothetical and un-
conditional ir~peratives is drawn and .the ambiguity of the word 'value' 
u,; examined. Objective value is defined and it is claimed that 
Be-.auvoir does ackr.owledge the existence of objective values defined 
· in this sense:. 
The Exposib.0n presents an interpretation and cri .t.:: ..:::al analysis of 
Beauvoir's ethics and traces the development cf her dialectic. 
Beginning wit.'1 the Sartrean definition of man, Beauvoir proceeds to 
discuss ambiguity, freedom and existence, disclosure, subjective 
attitudes chosen in regard to one's o·..m freedom and oppress ion. 22:ach 
of these topics is examined and shown to ~e essential to undP.rstanding 
Beauvoir's views concerning moral values and impei·atives. 
-ii-
The Conclusion is addressed to the questions of why Beauvoir 
rejects objective values, what kinds of things she understands object-
ive values to be and argues that in spite of her denial of objective 
values, Beauvoir does succeed in offering a moral philosophy. 
Finally, Beauvoir's significance as a moral philosopher is discussed. 
------------------ - -- -- -
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'lhe difficulties involved in understanding Simone de Beauvoir's 
Ethics of Ambiguity may be considerable for those unfamiliar with 
Sartre's phenomenological ontology as set forth in Being and Nothingness. 
Many of these difficulties are due to the rather unusual way in which 
existentialists use many terms. A certain familiarity with Sartre's 
philosophy and the technical language he employs to express his views 
is therefore highly desirable for gaining insight into Beauvoir's 
. 1 
moral philosophy. 
In the final chapter of Being and Nothingness Sartre raises many 
provocative questions concerning the relation between freedom and 
values. He leaves these questions unanswered al'ld concludes: 
''A11 these questions which refer us to a pure and 
not an accessory reflection, can find their 
reply only en the ethical plane. we shall devote 
to them a future work." 2 
Unfortunately, Sartre's promised work in ethics has not been forth-
caning. In La Force des choses Beauvoir states that by 1950 Sartre 
had given up the idea of putting forth a systematic work of ethics. 
¾n-iile it is not possible to offer an explanation of every term, 
the reader may find references to the glossary included in the Barnes 
translation of Being and Nothingness to be most helpful, pp. 799-807. 
See Bibliography. 
2 • 
Ibid., p. 798. 
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• 
Hazel Barnes speculates that Sartre believes that such a project 
would be not only irrelevant but also impossible. 
-s tatement made in an interview -in -1-964. 
She quotes Sartre's 
"It is necessary first for all men to be able 
to become me.n through improving the condition 
of their existence if they are going to be 
able to formulate a universal ethics. If I 
begin by telling them ''Ihou shalt not lie,' 
political action is no longer possible. What 
matters first is the liberation of man. 113 
A1though the problems of morality occur throughout Sartre's work, he 
has not published an ethics and it is sad to read of Sartre's recent 
announcement that his writing career is over because he is . nearly 
blind. 4 
Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity however takes up where 
Sartre left off in Being and Nothingness. Her moral philosophy is 
based on Sartre's phenomenological ontology and she carries it to its 
- -- logical consequences on the moral plane. She -readily acknowledges 
her debt to Sartre. Following a concise but coherent explanation of 
his description of man's being she states: 
"It is only in the last pages (of Being and 
Nothingness) th~t he opens up a perspective 
for an ethics • ~• 
Her work therefore is the ethical development of Sartrean ontology and 
is fundamentally based on it. Although her analyses do not differ 
from his in major respects, her originality is evidenced in her 
3 Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics, p. 30. 
4 . d . Associate Press, Paris: News Release, June 23, 1975. 
5Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 11. 
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dialectical development of the concept of man's failure to be in 
Sartre's philospphy. She states: 
"The failure described in Being and Nothingness 
is definitive but it is also ambiguous. 11 6 
This statement is of crucial importance for it provides Beauvoir with 
the starting point for the development of her moral philosophy. Her 
ethics is built around three key terms; definition of man, ambiguity 
and freedom. Sartre's definition of . man is essential to her concept 
of ambiguity which in turn is essential to her concept of freedom and 
freedom becomes the final theme of her moral philosophy. 
Although, according to Beauvoir, ambiguity has been recognized 
by other existentialist philosophers,
7 
Beauvoir's use of the concept 
is unique and certainly far more elaborate than that of other exist-
entialists. Her emphasis on the existentialist concept of ambiguity 
confirms her place in this philosophy but it also confirms her origin-
ality as an existentialist philosopher. As Camus has used the existen-
tialist concept of the absurd not as a final statement of the human 
condition but as a starting point for the development of his philosophy, 
so Beauvoir employs the concept of ambiguity in the same way. While 
Camus has often been regarded as the philosopher of the absurd, Beauvoir 
may be regarded as the philosopher of ambiguity. 
Simone de Beauvoir has presented a moral philosophy which denies 
objective values. Her ethical theory belongs to ethical systems denying 
6Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 11 
7Although Kierkegaard, whom Beauvoir mentions in this context 
uses the concept of ambiguity, his use is neither similar to not as 
developed as Beauvoir's notion of ambiguity. 
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8 
that it is possible to base moral norms on something objective. Here 
we encounter immediately one of the main problems we will be dealing 
with in this thesis. 
It has been claimed that any ethical system which denies 
explicitly that it is based on something objective is incapable of offer-
9 
ing any unconditional imperatives and it therefore either ceases to be 
a moral system at all or it is self-contradictory because it tacitly 
10 
presupposes what it denies. One of the aims of this thesis will be 
to critically investigqte this claim with respect to Beauvoir's ethical 
views. However~ what has been stated above is still in need of explana-
tion •. 
Unless a work of ethics implies unconditional imperatives, either 
explicit or implicit, which tell us how one ought to live a moral life, 
it cannot be considered an ethics. That this is so, is evident from the 
following considerations. Kant was the first to make a distinction be-
. . 11 
tween unconditional imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. The 
unconditional imperative states: 
'One ought to live a moral life and ·to live a moral 
life, one must (or must not) act in such and such 
a way.' 
8 t1 · fArnb' · E ucs £_ iguity, p. 11. 
9 
I use the term 'unconditional' in order to avoid confusion with 
Kant's categorical imperative. While Kant's categorical imperative is 
also an unconditional imperative, I avoid the term categorical because 
in the context of this thesis I do not necessarily prescribe to the 
precise content as that formulated by Kant.• 
lO f · . h ' 1 th. Ch 1 C. Dietric von Hi debrand, E ics, apters 8, 9, 6. 
11 Inunanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 
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The hypothetical imperative states: 
'If one wants to live a moral life, one should 
act in such and such a way. ' 
It is possible to attempt to offer a set of guidelines based on 
hypothetical imperatives. But this imperative implies only that we 
should act in such and such a way provided that we really want to 
reach a certain goal. ~ut whether we actually do act in this way is 
up to one's individual choice. One can always ask "Why should I live 
a moral life?" The merely hypothetical imperative cannot answer this 
question. Thus, in the final analysis, hypothetical imperatives do 
not tell us that we ought to lead a moral life and therefore cannot 
·properly provide the basis for ethics. While it is possible to formu-
late hypothetical imperatives without reference to objective values 
in the sense defined below, it is not possible to formulate uncon-
ditional imperatives without reference to objective values. Therefore, 
a system which denies objective values cannot formulate unconditional 
imperatives. A system is an ethics only if it is based upon uncon-
ditional imperatives and unconditional imperatives necessarily imply 
objective values. 
In her denial of objective values, Beauvoir accordingly claims 
that moral imperatives are always hypothetical and cannot be defined 
. .12 
2 priori On the basis of this explanation it would seem to follow 
therefore that Beauvoir does not offer an ethic at all. But it is the 
aim of this thesis to show that despite her denial of objective values 
12Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 134 
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and unconditional imperatives, Beauvoir nevertheless does succeed in 
presenting an ethic. 
Beauvoir succeeds in her effort to put forth a moral system be-
cause there are three possible ways in which an ethical system can be 
related to what is expressed in the statement, 'There are objective 
values." First, the proposition is explicitly acknowledged as true. 
Second, a moral system may be develop~d without explicitly affirrr,ing 
or denying objective values but the system implicitly presupposes them. 
Third, the system may explicitly deny objective values but the system 
implys the truth of what it denies. Here we have an inconsistency be-
tween what is explicitly stated by a system and what is tacitly pre-
supposed by it. 
It is this third possibility which applies to the moral system 
developed by Beauvoir. She denies objective values and along with 
them unconditional imperatives without really explaining what is 
meant by a morality based on objective values. But the word 'value' 
is itself ambiguous and so some clarification is here indicated. In 
one meaning 'value' is ordinarily used in relation to one's opinions 
on norms. According to ordinary usage one may attribute value to 
things which one deems desirable or useful. In a second meaning, 
value may be accorded to things which one thinks are important or worth-
while. In the third meaning, however, the word 'value' is used in a 
i:nore strict sense. Something is said to be a value because it has a 
positive and definite importance in itself 13 and independently of 
13 
Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, "The Categories of Im-
portance", pp. 34-63. 
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anyone's opinions, desires, convictions, decisions, recognition or 
actual practice. 
When one claims that values are objective he means that some-
thing is said to have value if it is better that it exist than not 
exist, regardless of anyone's opinions. Objective values have a 
character of importance which is independent of man's whims, desires, 
aims or acknowledgement. Objective values affirm that some states 
are rationally to be preferred to other states .regardless of anyone's 
whims, opinions or practice. For example, justice is to be preferred 
to injustice whether individual persons believe so or not and whether 
they are in practice just or not. Objective values are not absolute 
substances in themselves as Beauvoir seems to understand them to be 
but rather they are qualities of real things or states. The emphasis 
is not on the .ir total independence of man. (Whether there are values 
which are totally independent of man in every respect is not o~ con-
cern for the present context.) Rather, tjle emphasis is on their in-
dependence of man's opinio ns, desires and decisions (in the sense that 
it is not the case that something has a value because man decided 
that it shall have a value.) 
There are several different kinds of ethical systems based on 
something objective. However, in the general context of value ethics 
the objective value is the basis for ethical norms. Ethical theories 
based on objective values may disagree in many respects but all share 
a formal similarity in that they agree to the proposition: 'There 
are objective values." ('Value' to be understood in the third meaning 
of this term discussed above.) They may disagree with respect to which 
-a-
kinds of values do exist or with respect to which kinds of things 
actually do have value. Thus, to the logically prior question '!,re 
there objective values?' objectivists agree that there are. To the 
subsequent question 'What kinds of things are objective values or 
have objective value?' objectivists may disagree among each other 
without ceasing to be objectivists. The formal similarity of ethical 
theories based on objective values therefore is constituted by an 
agreement to the existence of objective values. It is possible, 
however, that there may be disagreement concerning which kinds of 
things have objective value. 
In sum, an ethical system is classified as based on objective 
values if it bases its norms on states which are implicitly or ex-
-plicitly acknowledged as being better than others and are to be pre-
ferred to other states. It is possible however that an ethical sys-
-- --tern explicitly denies this basis but implicitly -presupposes it. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to prove either the exis-
tence or source of objective values but to show that Beauvoir 
implicitly acknowledges objective valu~s in the sense defined and 
affirms unconditional imperatives although she denies the first and 
does not offer a justification for the second. But it is this very 
acknowledgement and affirmation which makes her work a system of 
ethics. 
In order to furnish a basis for examining this claim, a 
critical exposition of her moral views foilows. 
II EXPOSITION 
A. The Importance of the Sartrean Definition of Man 
Although some philosophers might argue that Sartre would not 
presume to define Man since according to his philosophy Man defines 
himself by his actions, Beauvoir nevertheless attributes to him a 
fundamental definition of man: 
"that being whose being is not to be, that sub-
jectivity which realizes itself only as a 
presence in the world, that engag .ed freedom, 
that surging of the for-oneself which is 
inunediately given for others 1114 and "a being 
who makes himself a lack of being in order that 
there might be being. 1115 
Beauvoir accepts this definition of man and the Sa:ctrean definition 
of man becomes the first step in the development of her dialectic. 
Man is understood by both Sartre and Beauvoir to be a being 
which .lacks being. Being is understood to be a pure positivity, a 
totality, the synthesis of the for-itself and in-itself, God. But 
according to Sartre, such a synthesis is logically impossible.
16 
Consciousness is always consciousness of an object. It in-
cludes its object but always remains separate and at a distance from 
14 
Ethics £f A.'n.biguity, p. 10. 
15Ib.d __ i_., p. 11. 
16 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 400. 
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the object. But what separates conscious~ess and its object is nothing. 
For this reason both Sartre and Beauvoir claim that man carries nothing-
ness at his heart and it is man who brings nothingness into the world. 17 
.Further, man himself is originally a nothingness. The argument which 
establishes man as a negativity fundamentally progresses in the follow-
ing way. Presupposed is the idea of a complete and fixed totality, the 
synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself, a being which perfectly 
coincides with itself, God. Due to the nature of consciousness however 
such a synthesis is impossible and therefore there is no God. Because 
man is consciousness, man is not complete being. 
That which is incomplete is a lack 
. 
That which lacks (complete being) fails (to be complete). 
That which fails is a negativity. 
That which is a negativity is nothing. 
Thus, for Sartre and Beauvoir: 
Incomplete implys lack 
Lack implys failure 
Failure implys negativity 
Negativity implys nothingness 
It may be pointed out that this thesis is a very shaky one since one 
might argue that the jump from failure to nothingness is highly 
questionable. Simply because something fails to be z does not pre-
c~ude the possibility of its being X and Y and if so it cannot be 
said to be nothing. However, man defined as a "being whose being is 
not to be" and a "being who makes himself .a lack of being in order 
17 
Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 31 and p. SS 
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that there might be being" has important implications for Beauvoir's 
thesis. 
First, the movement by which man makes himself a lack of being 
is the movement which confirms man's power to choose; his very freedom 
is affirmed. Second, by making himself a lack man distinguishes him-
self as separate from the world. This movement which is the original 
rr~vement of subjectivity not only distinguishes man as a free and 
separate existent, it is also the movement by which man discloses the 
world. Of these two implications more will be said as this thesis 
progresses but it is the following implication which for present pur-
poses, I would like to emphasize. Third, according to Beauvoir, man 
defined as a lack of being is the necessary condition for ethics. If 
man is defined as a being having a fixed and given nature, there 
would be no possibility for him to become moral. She points out that 
- ~ -
11without failure, no ethics. 1118 To the objee-tion that existentialism 
is a philosophy of the absurd and despair, Beauvoir replies that even 
the most optimistic ethics must acknowledge that man fails to be 
perfect. 
"One does not offer an ethics to a God. 1119 
According to existentialist ontology man can never surmount his fail-
ure to be. If man could become being, a pure positivity, he would no 
18 
Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 10 
19Ib.d __ i_., p. 10 
. longer be man but thing. 
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20 But in his striving to be, man exists as man 
Having-to-be that which he is not and can never be affirms the tension 
which exists between t.~e lack of being and being but it is a necessary 
tension for it sustains human existence. The hyphens are intentional 
for they indicate the dyna~ic movement, the projection toward the 
future by which man transcends his immanence. 
Much of Beauvoir's thought is concerned with man's lack-of-being, 
his having-to-be, his transcendence and his possibilities for becoming. 
She is convinced that originally man is a negativity and only because 
he is a negativity is it possible for him to become moral. 
Beauvoir criticizes other ethical systems for failing to adequately 
account for the possibility of an evil will. She claims that classi-
cal metaphysics of transcendence fail because evil is reduced to error. 
Humanistic ethics fail because man is defined as complete in a com-
plete world. Kantian ethics fail also. It is difficult, Beauvoir 
-claims, to account for an evil will in Kant's system since it is diffi-
cult to understand why man would reject the law he gives to himself. 
Beauvoir claims that this problem is due to the fact that Kant defined 
man as a pure positivity. 
Having refuted other ethical systems on the basis of their def-
initions of man, Beauvoir then goes on to make three rather startling 
20 
It is of interest to note at this point that the existential-
ist theory of existence is mere than merely reminiscent of the Heracli-
tean doctrine of t.~e strife of opposites. According to the existent-
ialists, Being is a pure positivity, Nothingness is of course a pure 
negativity and Existence is the strife or "tension" which prevails be- . 
tween these two polarities. 
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claims. First, existentialism is the only philosophy in which ethics 
21 has a place. Second, existentialism is the only philosophy to give 
1 
. 22 
area role to evil. Third, existentialist ethics appears as the 
only proposition of salvation which one can address to men.
23 
These are indeed very strong claims and Beauvoir ' s rationale 
for making them is based on the Sartrean definition of man. Only be-
cause "man is first defined as a nega:tivity, 1124 because he is "perpetu-
ally playing with the negative 1125 is it possible for him to have an 
evil will. 26 These claims will be examined in greater detail as this 
thesis progresses. But for now it is enough to notice the importance 
of the Sartrean definition of man for Beauvoir. She rejects other 
ethical systems because she disagrees with their definitions of man. 
She accepts Sartre's definition as the only correct one and her accept-
ance of it provides her with the foundation on which she supports her 
own moral philosophy. 
21 
Ethics of Ambi~uiti, p. 34. 
22 Ibid., p. 34 
23 rbid., p. 159 
24 Ibid., p. 33. 
25 Ibid., p. 33. 




When she claims that man's failure is definitive but it is 
. 27 . . . . .. also ambiguous Beauvoir has in mind the idea of man as an original 
negativity but who has the capacity to attain some positivity. 
By ambiguity Beauvoir means two · things; that which has dual 
aspects and that which is non-final. Thus, Beauvoir's notion of 
ambiguity is itself ambiguous. In the sense of duality, ambiguity 
has to do with the being of a thing. Man for example, is aware of 
:the dual aspects of his being. He experiences himself as both a · 
subjective presence and an objective presence in the world, an 
internality and an externality, _mind and matter, significant and in-
significant, invulnerable and vulnerable, treated as a means by 
others and yet an end in himself, a being which is an immanence in 
the present and yet a being which transcends himself toward the future. 
The ambiguity of man's being which Beauvoir claims is implied by 
his failure to be means that man is not one thing at one time and 
another at another time. "Man is both at one and the same time. The 
dual aspects of man's being is the "tragic ambiguity of the human con-
28 
dition." It is universal and irreducible. 
In the second sense of meaning, ambiguity refers to that which 
is not final, fixed or determined. Beauvoir clearly explains the 
27 
Ibid., p. 11. 
28Ib 'd __ i_., p. 7. 
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distinction between the existentialist notions of the absurd and the 
ambiguous. 
"The notion of ambiguity must not be confused 
with that of absurdity. To declare that 
existence is absurd is to deny that it can 
ever be given a meaning; to say that it is 
ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is 29 
never fixed, that it must constantly be won." 
Thus, when Beauvoir asserts that man, the human condition, freedom, 
the will, human action, existence and ethics are all ambiguous, she 
means: (1) that they have dual aspects and (2) that they are not 
determined, fixed or final. 
Two further points in regard to Beauvoir's notion of ambiguity 
· should be made at this point. First, ambiguity applies to those 
things which pertain to man and to human states. It does not apply 
to objects. It would be a misuse of Beauvoir's notion of ambiguity 
to say for example that an object such as a tree or a stone is 
ambiguous. 
"••• the in-itself is, and negation has no 30 
hold over this being, this pure positivity." 
To say of something that it is ambiguous is to say that it is an 
active principle of movement and as such it has the capacity for 
change. 
Secondly, those things which are ambiguous in the sense of 








irreducible. The negative aspect of a thing is its nothingness, a 
void, an emptiness without content. But in its positive aspect, the 
thing does have content. Both aspects however are dynamic principles 
of movement. 
Now, originally ambiguous things are negativities. They are 
empty and devoid of meanings. Positivity is attained or in Beauvoir's 
terms "won". But positivity does not cancel out negativity completely. 
Negativity always remains. Because things are ambiguous in the sense 
that they are not final, the negative aspect is the necessary condition 
whereby a thing has the capacity to attain more content, win new mean-
ings. Thus, no matter how much content an ambiguous thing acquires, 
_no matter how many meanings are won, no matter how much a thing is 
positivized, because the negative aspect always remains, t.½e capacit y 
for future positivity is possible. Positivity and- Negativity are t..~e~e-
fore dual aspects of one and the same thing 'which make possible the 
dynamic capacity for future acquisition through movement. 
This movement is not to be understood as the Hegelia.-ri act of 
surpassing by which opposition is raised up, canceled out or 
synt..liesized, however. According to existentialist conversion, the 
movement of the positive aspect toward an object is constructive. The 
object is taken up and converted to the negative but the negative 
never becomes totally positive. It may be considered in one sense as 
a sort of repository which gains positive content but · never itself 
becomes positive. But t..1-ie negative aspect · is not merely passive. 
Both positive and negative aspects are active and while the move.~ent 
-17-
of the positive is constructive, the movement of .the negative is of 
course the opposite, rejection. 
In sum, when Beauvoir claims that something is ambiguous, she 
asserts that (1) it is an active principle of movement and change 
and as such it is never fixed, determined or finalized and (2) it 
has dual aspects which are opposed and irreducible. 
Ambiguous things (man and his states) never become fully posi-
tive. At the start they are negativities and acquire~ positivity. 
To become a pure positivity would reduce something to an in-itself. 
But Beauvoir charges that philosophies and religions have tried to 
mask ambiguity. They have tried to reduce mind to matter, or to re-
absorb matter into mind, or to merge them within a single substance. 
They have denied death or denied life.
31 
They have tried to elimi-
nate ambiguity by emphasizing one aspect and ignoring the other or 
they have attempted to synthesize them. Beauvoir considers attempts 
to evade the fundamental ambiguity of man and his states to be dis-
honest and cowardly. Ani.biguity is and it is irreducible. Man 
must honestly face it and assume it for only then can he live a 
genuinely moral life. 
31 
~-, pp. 7 and 8. 
c. Freedom and Existence 
Beauvoir's discussion of freedom tends to be rather complex. 
Her analysis of freedom (which, as already stated, becomes the final 
theme in her 'moral philosophy) is both metaphysical and practical 
and often she makes no clear distinction between the two. Further, 
like Sartre, Beauvoir often speaks of freedom as something which acts 
itself without the acknowledgement of an agent. It is sometimes 
somewhat curious to read that freedom wills itself, freedom engages 
.itself or freedom grounds itself, etcetera. But this is partly due 
to an idiosyncracy of writing style and partly due to the fact that 
for both philosophers, freedom is an active principle of movement 
and of course subjectivity is presupposed. 
Perhaps in a spirit of practical wisdom Sartre saves the 
following definition of freedom for the very last page of Being and 
Nothingness: 
. 
"A freedom which wills itself freedom is in 
fact a being-which-is-not-what-it-is and 
which-is-what-it-is-not and which chooses · 
as the ideal of being being-what-it-is-not 
and not-being-what-it-is. 11 32 · 
·rf one is able to follow an Ariadne's thread through this 
verbal labyrinth, one sees that freedom, like man, is also a lack 
32 
Being~ Nothingness, p. 798. 
.. 
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of being. Beauvoir shares with Sartre this same concept of freedom 
but she defines it more simply as the ability "to surpass the given 
. 33 
toward an open future." For both Sartre and Beauvoir, freedom is 
nei1:.her a thing or a quality. Freedom is an active principle of 
movement which constantly projects itself beyond itself. It is 
ambiguous because it is both an immanence and a transcendence. 
Man defined as "a being who makes himself a lack of being" 
affirms for Beauvoir that man freely ch~oses to distinguish himself 
as a separate existence in the world. This movement has three con-
sequences: (1) subjectivity is confirmed, . (2) freedom is confirmed 
and (3) the world is disclosed. To attain clarity in this matter 
it may be helpful to attempt to trace the movement of freedom in 
accordance with Beauvoir's analysis. 
Man casts himself into the world in a spontaneous way. The 
original spontaneity of freedom is purely negative, that is to say 
freedom at this point is without content. It is empty, a void, _a 
nothingness. But freedom is by nature an active principle of move-
ment and necessarily projects itself ahead of itself. The original 
spontaneity of freedom is . not however a meaningless transcendence 
projecting itself randomly in any and all directions. Freedom is 
always directed toward something external to it. Using a physical 
analogy to help clarify this point, one might consider the act of 
33 
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sight. The eye has the capacity to see but without something to see, 
the eye remains content-less so to speak. The eye is necessarily pro-
jected toward something external to it and this externality is some-
thing which one chooses to direct the eye toward. The original pro-
jection of vision is then grounded by the external object. As sight 
is a relation between eye and object, so freedom is a relation between 
itself and an externality. Of the many possible externalities open 
to freedom, the subject must choose those particular objects toward 
which to direct freedom and ground it. At this point the original 
spontaneity of freedom is converted to willed freedom. Freedom then 
engages itself with its object and in a sense literally takes up the 
object. The object then becomes a part of freedom and ·freedom has 
"won" some content. It has justified itself and given itself area-
son to be. It is no longer a pure negativity. Freedom becomes positiv-
-ized py the acquisition of content but because man's freedom is 
infinite according to Beauvoir, the void is never completely filled. 
There always remains a part of freedom which is empty, a nothingness. 
No matter how much content freedom acquires, no matter how many mean-
ings are won, freedom is never totally positivized. Fo.r this reason 
Beauvoir claims that man's freedom is never fulfillea.
34 
Thus free-
dom is ambiguous since it has both positive and negative aspects 
neither of which cancels out tb .e other. But the negative aspect is 
34 
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the necessary condition for the acquisition of further content. If it 
were possible for freedom to become totally positive, freedom would no 
longer be freedom, an active principle of movement, but instead would 
be reduced to an in-itself, a thing as all pure positivities are. 
Beauvoir's notion of ambiguity applied to freedom means therefore that 
freedom has both positive and negative aspects which are irreducible 
and because freedom is both infinite and active it is never finalized. 
Freedom in both its aspects is active. In its positive aspect freedom 
is a constructive movement transcending itself and creating new mean-
ings. In its negative aspect freedom also creates meanings but it 
does so in a negative way, by rejection. Construction and rejection 
therefore are the two acts whereby freedom acquires content and 
justifies itself. Further, in both construction and rejection freedom 
commits itself in a positive way by engaging itself with the object. 
-- ~ This same movement also confirms the supreme _i,.ndependence of freedom 
over object according to Beauvoir since the subject can either affirm 
or reject it. 
'.there are some philosophers who have argued that the exis-
tentialists have merely substituted freedom for essenc~. But Beauvoir's 
analysis of the arPbiguity of freedom is, I believe,clearly an attempt 
to refute this charge. Applying her notion of ambiguity to freedom, 
she attempts to show that originally freedom is a pure negativity in 
the sense that it is totally without content. This means of course 
that originally freedom is nothing. 1'herefore, to say that the exis-
tentialists have substituted essence with freedom is to say they have 
s~s .ti.tuted essence with nothing. And this is exactly what the exis-
temtialists do say. ~__an originally has no essence, not even freedom. 
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Beauvoir's analysis of the ambiguity of freedom and her emphasis 
on the distinction between original spontaneity ("a so to speak 
natural freedom") and willed freedom serves to answer this charge and 
also the related criticism that it is contradictory to claim that man 
wills his freedom if in fact he is free at the start. Beauvoir 
answers that the original movero.ent of spontaneously casting oneself 
into the world is converted to willed freedom because freedom is al-
ways projected toward something external to it but the externality 
must be chosen. Freedom thereby becomes engaged and its chosen en-
gagement effects the transition from original spontaneity to willed 
freedom, from nature to morality. When man wills the engagement of 
his freedom in a particular and chosen object, man thereby commits 
himself and is responsible for his choice. For this reason, Beauvoir 
35 
insists that "t...½e moment of choice is the moment of morality." 
Man's passion to be is universal. Every man strives to attain 
being but necessarily and logically fails. Because he is a conscious-
ness, man can never be that which he is not. He can never be one with 
an object. But in his very act of striving to be, man exists. Exis-
tence is the tension which prevails between the lack of being which 
is man and the in-itself. But this tension is necessary for it sus-
tains existence. Although man strives to attain being and fails, as 
he strives, he acts, he exists and through his actions he gives his 
• freedom content and justifies his existence. Thus, Beauvoir claims 
35 
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that freedom is a movement which merges with existence. Freedom and 
existence in her philosophy are two metaphysical principles which are 
logically distinguishable but they are not distinguishable in fact. 
D. Disclosure 
Man defined as a "being which makes himself a lack of being in 
order that there might be being" is not only the movement which con-
firms subjectivity and freedom, it is also the movement by which man 
discloses the world. Beauvoir states that man does not create the 
world and she is not particularly concerned with who does. Man however 
does disclose the world. Disclosure of the world is a basic theme in 
Beauvoir's ethics. Although she does not precisely explain the notion 
of disclosure, this concept is woven throughout her thought and it 
ties in with her notions of original spontaneity, passion, freedom 
and especially the interdependence of freedoms. 
Man's acts are manifestations of his choice to ground his free-
dom in a particular way. As man acts carrying out his particular 
36 
projects, he "incribes himself in matter." In and through his pro-
jects man raises new objects in the world. If one writes a book or 
sculpts a statue, one has contributed something to the world and has 
succeeded in disclosing a new meaning. Each person in and through his 
own particular and freely chosen projects makes his own unique con-
tributions to the world. He discloses it in a new and different way. 
Each person therefore helps define the world and the given world is 
36 
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a world defined by men freely expressing therr~elves in their projects. 
To restrain freedom, either one's own or that of another, is not only 
to restrain one's existence, it is also to deprive the world of 
meanings. Rather than being . enriched, the world remains a lesser 
world than it might otherwise have been. For this reason the freedom 
of each person must be respected. If a freedom is oppressed, then 
the individual and the world are limited. Each person helps disclose 
the world for others. The world disclosed to me is a world defined 
for me through the efforts and projects of others and their world is 
also a world which I and others help define for t.~em. Therefore all 
freedoms are inter-dependent and through freedom, which is universal, 
each man shares a bond with all others. The freedom of each man 
must be allowed both by himself and by others to project itself to-
ward an open future since the world disclosed for all men is a world 
disclosed by and through the projects of each individual person. 
All men, Beauvoir claims, have a passion to be but there are 
two types of passion. In the case of maniacal passion the person 
wishes to entrap the object but this is impossible since subject and 
object always remain sep~ate. Man can do no more than disclose the 
object but maniacal passion believes that it alone can disclose the 
object and wishes to disclose it only for oneself • . Ma.'liacal passion 
is therefore a selfish passion. Generous passion on the other 
hand strives to disclose the object (thing or person), but not to 
en±rap it. It agrees to remain separate from the object and the 
object, therefore, is open to the engagement of the freedoms of 
others also. This type of passion is considered by Beauvoir as a 
-
-26-
genuinely moral passion since the person acts in love to generously 
disclose the world not only for himself but also for others. 
Even if man's efforts fail, even if his projects are dismal 
failures and his efforts abortive, he still succeeds in disclosure. 
He has still contributed something in the very effort by engaging 
his freedom in a positive way. Unsuccessful meanings are still 
meanings nevertheless. A book may be poorly written, a painting may 
be a terrible painting but they remain books and paintings although 
they are poor ones. They are concrete objects open to the engage-
ment of the freedoms of others. The positive aspect of their free-
doms may affirm the object and on the basis of it go on to construct 
new meanings or, in its negative aspect, may reject it,· but, in 
either case, the object is open to the positive engagements of free-
doms. So even in man's failures there is an element of success. 
The genuinely moral man is the man who generously discloses new 
and concrete meanings in the world for himself and for others. Thus, 
Beauvoir's concept of disclosure is not a question of disclosure to 
but rather it is a question of disclosure for. 
In sum, other men through their freedom disclose the world for 
me as I through my freedom disclose the world for them. The world 
in which each person must exist and act is a world which is defined 
by persons transcending their i,.,unanence and contributing new meanings 
through their projects. If transcendence is cut off, · the person is 
reduced to a pure contingency, an immanence, a thing and the world is 
deprived of those meanings it could have had if freedoms had been 
allowed to surpass themselves. In cutting off transcendence one not 
---- -..: __ 
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only limits the individual, one also limits the world. Each individual 
contributes meanings within his own particular situation and the world 
and others are enriched by the particular, unique and concrete con-
tributions of each man. For this reason, Beauvoir believes that all 
freedoms are inter-dependent, that through freedom each shares a bond 
with all and therefore the freedom of every man must be respected. 
The genuinely moral person is the person who recognizes and adheres to 
the demands of freedom. Beauvoir, insists, therefore "to will oneself 
37 
free is to will others free" and "The me-others relation is as in-
dissoluble as the subject-object relation." 
37Eth' f Arnb. ' __ i_c_s .£_ iguity, 
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E. SUBJECTIVE A'J:TITUDES 
In keeping with the traditional existentialist vi~w, Beauvoir 
holds that man faces his freedom in anguish. Since his acts are def-
initive and he alone is responsible for them, man must decide what 
he is to do with this freedom he faces and cannot deny. Beauvoir 
offers an analysis of the various possible subjective attitudes one 
might assume in dealing with one's own freedom. She begins with the 
universal and unchosen situation of childhood. The child's world is a 
given world. It is a world in which meanings and values have already 
been set up by others and the child accepts it as quite independent 
of him and indifferent to his presence in it. He submits to the 
rules and to the authority of others and remains unaware of his free-
dom. Beauvoir believes that it is not until adolescence that the 
child becomes aware of the demands of his freedom. It is at the 
point that one begins to question and doubt the rules and those who 
enforce them that one reaches moral maturity. This is the time when 
one must leave the security of the infantile world and assume the re-
sponsibility for one's own choices. There are however some persons who 
never outgrow the infantile world. As an exair~le Beauvoir cites the 
situations of women and slaves. They continue to live in a world 
governed by others. They are unaware of the ambiguity of their free-
dom and do not realize that by engaging the negative aspect of their 
freedom, they can reject their situation. Such persons can live a 
--
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moral life within the limits prescribed for them by others because 
they are ignorant of the possibility to transcend these limits. What 
must be done according to Beauvoir is to bring the oppressed slaves 
and women to an awareness of their freedom so that they can then choose 
their own liberation. But it is not enough merely to enlighten the 
oppressed. They should also be provided with the means and instru-
ments with which they can actualize their freedom. Once one reaches 
moral maturity, eit..~er naturally or by enlightenment, one must assume 
the demands of freedom honestly by engaging it in objects of one's 
own choosing. But, according to Beauvoir, since the demands of free-
dom are so overwhelming, man often tries to escape it. 
Among the various attitudes of escape which Beauvoir describes 
are those of the sub-man, the serious man, the nihilist, the adventurer 
and the maniacally passionate man. While these various attitudes 
differ in many respects they all share the following common features: 
(1) All are internal states of consciousness and concern 
how one confronts his own freedom. 
(2) All are freely chosen attitudes. 
(3) All are attempts to evade the demands of freedom. 
(4) All are dishonest because they are evasive. 
(5) All imply evil. Since all freedoms are interdependent, 
to be dishonest in dealing with one's own freedom is 
also to be dishonest in dealing with the freedoms of 
others and to treat the freedoms of others dishonestly 
is evil. 
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Beauvoir's descriptions of these various attitudes, therefore, 
play a significant part in her moral philosophy. But what really 
interests Beauvoir is the attitude of the "serious man" because it 
is the most common due to the fact that all men were once children. 
The serious attitude is a carry-over of the indoctrinations of child-
hood. Like children, the "serious" do not question but accept 
"values" as absolutes which have already been set up. The serious 
man attempts to escape his subjectivity by submerging his freedom in 
an external object. He subordinates himself to the importance of 
things and prefers the object to himself because it allows him to lose 
his subjectivity in it. What primarily concerns the serious man is 
not the nature of the thing but t.½e fact that its objectivity pro-
vides for him the necessary factor in which he can engulf his trans-
cendence. By subordinating himself to the object, the serious man 
beiieves that the importance of the object confers importance on him. 
But Beauvoir holds the serious man is dangerous. Dishonestly evad-
ing the importance of his own subjectivity, he does not recognize the 
importance of the subjectivity of others. Consequently, he sub-
ordinates persons to things, placing the value of things over the 
value of individuals. He then readily sacrifices individuals in favor 
of the Thing. 
Beauvoir cites many examples of the abstract Forms to which the 
serious man subordinates himself and others: the Nation., the Empire, 
"the Union, t..~e Future, the Cause, the State, the Church, the Party, 
the Army, t.lie Economy, t..."'le Production, the Revolution, etc. For the 
"serious " there is being only in the Form. It alone is the object 
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which has significance and in relation to It, man is insignificant and 
therefore expendable. But Beauvoir argues these Forms are human con-
·structions · and have value not in-themselves but only insofar as they 
serve man. 
"We (existentialists) repudiate all idealisms, 
mysticisms, etcetera which prefer a Form to 
man himself. 1139 
39 
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F. · OPPRESSION 
As has already been stated, Beauvoir accepts Sartre's ontology. 
For both philosophers, consciousness is an activity and the activity 
of consciousness is negation. Subjectivity distinguishes itself 
from the object of consciousness by negating the object, (i. e. sub-
jectivity asserts that the object is other than itself; that the 
object is not subjectivity itself). Every subject distinguishes 
himself as separate and distinct from others by negating the other 
.as an object. However, if one also negates the other as a subject 
as well, this act constitutes an act of oppression. It is on the 
basis of this existential analysis of the activity of consciousness 
that Beauvoir asserts the three startling claims for existentialism 
mentioned in Part II-A of this thesis. 
Beauvoir claims that "oppression" applies only on the human 
level. Man is never oppressed by things, only by other men. 
Although things offer resistance, this resistance sustains human 
action by providing the tension necessary for existence. The thing 
is an obstacle and there is a risk of not conquering it but this is 
not a denial of freedom. The object is the necessary condition 
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The negating activity of consciousness and the inter-depend-
ence of freedoms explain why oppression is possible. Beauvoir 
further elaborates this point by employing the Hegelian theory that 
each consciousness competes with other consciousnesses for being. 
But if a consciousness "were everything, there would be nothing be-
. ·side it; the world would be empty. There would be nothing to 
possess and I myself would be nothing. 1141 Thus, all men depend on 
others for existence and since freedom merges with existence, all 
freedoms too are inter-dependent. 
The ambiguity of human life is that it is both an inunanence 
and a transcendence. If a life is reduced to only an immanence by 
having its transcendence cut off, then "living is only not dying. 1142 
But there are some men who cut off the transcendence of 
others. This is due to the fact that they do not recognize the re-
quirement for universal freedom. They dishon~~tly recognize their 
own transcendence but refuse to recognize the transcendence of 
others and reduce them to mere inunanences. This is the "real role 
to evil" which Beauvoir claims only existentialism does recognize 
and is able to account for. This claim is based on her analysis of 
individual freedom and the inter-dependence of freedoms and also 
on Sartre's claim that existentialism is the only theory which does 
t d t b . t 43 no re uce man o an o Jee. 
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Because freedom is ambiguous, both 
43 sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 37. 
-34-
· immanent and transcendent, both negative and positive, both autonomous 
and interdependent, is it possible to account for an evil will. Be-
. ' 1 1 . . th h . 1144 cause man is 'perpetua ly paying wi t e negative it is possible 
for him to act on the freedoms of others in a negative way, enslave-
ment. There is according to Beauvoir only one solution to oppression, 
rejection; the negative aspect of freedom which returns to the positive 
by giving itself content through action, revolt. 
Beauvoir believes that the oppressed must be awakened to the 
truth of his oppression and brought to an awareness of his freedom 
to reject it. When the oppressed is brought to this awareness of 
the possibilities open to the engagement of his freedom, he will 
then choose his own liberation. 
Beauvoir also believes that for a liberating action to be a 
thoroughly moral action, it would have to be achieved through the 
conversion of the oppressors as well as the oppressed. By this she 
means that the oppressor should be made aware of the inter-dependence 
of freedoms. He should be made aware that the master in his depen-
dence on the slave for his existence and identity is himself a 
slave, that by limiting others, he limits not only the individual 
but also the world. Of the conversion of oppressors, however, not 
enough is said and Beauvoir dismisses the enlightenment of the 
, . . 45 . h . oppressor as 'utopian reveries." And indeed s e must, in order 
44Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 33 
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to be consistent with her claL~s that tension is necessary for 
existence, that without oppression there could be no liberating 
movement, that the world has always been at war and always will 
be and this is not an abnormal situation. 46 She further argues 
that the only justification for oppression and tyranny is the fact 
that they are opposed to freedom and through them freedom is man-
ifested. 
"Without crime and tyranny, there could be 
no liberation of man; one cannot escape 
that dialectic which goes from freedom to 47 
freedom through dictatorship and tyranny." 
According to Beauvoir; therefore,oppression is evil and yet it is a 
-necessary condition for freedom. Further, it seems not only ex-
tremely unfair but also contradictory on Beauvoir's part to con-
tend throughout her work for the enlightenment of the oppressed on 
the one hand and yet on the other hand she is unwilling to grant 
enlightenment to the oppressor. Twice Beauvoir recognizes the 
necessity for the conversion and re-education of oppressors and 
. those who serve them and both times she dismisses the possibility; 
first as "utopian 1148 and again as impractical. 
"The desirable thing would be to re-educate 
••• But the urgency of the struggle forbids 
this slow labor. 1149 
46Ib.d __ 1._., p. 119· 
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I find myself somewhat impatient with Beauvoir's attitude. All men 
are free but only some are free to be educated. 'llle oppressed must 
50 be enlightened but she claims the oppressors must be fought." 
Beauvoir attempts to justify violence toward oppressors in two 
ways: First, 
Secondly, 
"A freedom which is occupied in denying free-
dom is itself so outrageous, that the out-
·rageousness of the violence which one prac-
tices against it is almost cancelled out. 1151 
"Since we can conquer our enemies only by 
acting upon their facticity," (their sub-
jectivity by definition escapes us) 
"by reducing them to things, we have to make 
ourselves things." 52 
'lllus, according to Beauvoir, in violent confrontations we have a sit-
uation of object versus object. But she evidently thinks this is ex-
cusable because reduced to an immanence, a pure contingency, man is 
nothing. Further, it is difficult to see how we can make ourselves 
things in order to do violence since Beauvoir has argued that due 
to the nature of consciousness, the elimination of subjectivity is 
impossible. Beauvoir concludes however that 
"Violence is justified only if it offers con-
~rete possibilities for freedom. 53 
so~., p. 136. 
51
rbid., p. 97. 
52 . 
99. Ibid., p. 
53Ib. d __ 1._., p. 137. 
·-.37-
In her discussion concerning the problems involved in moral 
decisions, Beauvoir argues that the ultimate end of every moral action 
is freedom. The freedom of each individual man is more important 
than the value of relative goods. Since relative goods are subor-
dinate to man's freedom, we should prefer freedom over relative goods. 
But the real moral problem is how to choose between freedoms. Be.au-
voir considers two basic criteria for choice. First, numerical con-
siderations. It is preferable to choose the salvation of the greater 
number, but such decisions are generally abstract and rare. Other 
considerations, says Beauvoir, are usually taken into account, for 
example, the social functions of those between whom one must choose. 
She considers as a principle of selection those who are the most use-
ful to preserve. But utility has no absolute meaning in itself 
according to Beauvoir. Things are useful only insofar as they serve 
man, and, therefore, "useful" requires the complement "man". But 
since man is a transcendence as well as an immanence, she adds 
another complement, "future". Man's justification is never fulfilled 
but always to come. Therefore, Beauvoir concludes: 
"A choice (between freedoms) is therefore 
possible in the light of the future. 1154 
This is Beauvoir's reply to how we are to choose not between man and 
object, but between individuals. In claiming that the choice should 
be made in light of the futures open to individuals' freedoms, she 
54 
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presents more problems than she solves. 
Although she has argued throughout that man is his future, that 
by his projects man justifies his existence, that to reduce man to an 
immanence is to reduce him to no more than an objective presence in 
the world, that cut off from his transcendence man is merely a thing, 
Beauvoir's claim that the salvation of persons should be decided on 
the basis of their individual futuricities is a claim made without 
perspectives. The more important question is what constitutes the 
criteria by which freedoms are to be evaluated and decided. Do we 
judge freedoms qualitatively or quantitatively? Beauvoir seems to 
imply the latter in her example of the married couple living in a hove1. 55 
If they cannot be persuaded to change their life-style; "they must be 
allowed to follow their preference. 1156 But if they have children, 
then the situation changes because "freedom and the future are on the 
57 
side of the latter." Although she admits that due to the complex-
ity of particular situations, analysis is necessary before one can 
make an ethical choice, 58 Beauvoir's assertion that choices be made 
in light of individual futuricities has dangerous and morally un-
acceptable implications. Pushed to its logical consequences and with-
out additional criteria, her claim implies the sacrifice of the old 
SSib.d __ i_., p. 143. 
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for the young, the sick for the healthy, etc. Unfortunately, she 
· does not consider these implications, but instead goes on to analyze 
the meaning of The Future. She discredits what she terms the 
# 
"Future Myth" by arguing that past, present and future are not 
separate and distinct entities in themselves but rather all com-
prise a single temporal form. But this argument does not answer 
the problem Beauvoir raised concerning moral choices between free-
doms beyond her initial recommendation of "in light of the future." 
Thus it is clear that Beauvoir believes every moral action 
aims at the freedom of man. Opposed to the various dishonest 
attitudes which necessarily imply evil {oppression) Beauvoir de-
59 
scribes the attitude of her moral ideal, the "genuine man". The 
genuine man is the genuinely free man. He honestly faces the 
ambiguity of freedom and assumes it. He does not try to escape the 
demands of his freedom nor dishonestly evade his responsibility. He 
is aware that his freedom wills itself toward the future through the 
freedoms of ot...~ers. He therefore recognizes the fact that the free-
doms of others must be respected. This recognition imposes limits 
on the genuine man, but in his self limitation, he fin~ his own law. 
He is autonomous, but the law he gives himself is universal. 
"An ethics of ambiguity will be one which will 
refuse to deny a priori that separate exis-
tents can, at the same time, be bound to each 
other, that their individual freedoms can 
forge laws valid for a11. 11 60 
59 . 
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Beauvoir is careful to point out that freedom is not licence. 
Man is not free to do anything at all. Dostoevsky's famous formula 
"If God does not exist, everything is permitted" has been acknowl-
edged by Sartre as the very starting point of atheistic existential-
61 
ism. But Beauvoir claims that the meaning of this formula has 
been abused. God's absence does not authorize all licence but 
rather, she claims, God's absence makes man responsible for himself 
and for his world. It may also be pointed out that "permitted" is 
also ambiguous. It may mean 'allowed' or it may mean 'possible.' 
It is in this latter sense that Beauvoir understands the term. 
Everything is certainly not allowed. Oppression, evasion, dishonesty 
and the abuse of other's freedom are not allowed but they are possible. 
And because they are possible, the genuinely moral man will fight 
against them. Beauvoir is convinced that abstention is complicity 
and therefore the moral man is the man of action. The task of 
ethics, she holds, is to work for the cause of universal freedom, to 
enlighten and educate the ignorant and t.~e oppressed, to critically 
oppose oppression and injustice and to make the facile difficult. 
61 
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III CONCLUSION 
As has already been stated in the Introduction, if a moral 
philosophy is properly to be considered a system of ethics, it must 
offer unconditional imperatives, and unconditional imperatives 
necessarily refer to objective values~ Since Beauvoir denies ob-
jective values and along with them unconditional imperatives, it 
would seem to follow that her Ethics~ Ambiguity is not really an 
ethic at all. 
But due to a happy inconsistency Beauvoir does succeed in 
offering an ethics in spite of her denial. She does tell the reader 
what one ought to do in spite of his opinions, wishes, desires and 
tendencies to evade moral responsibilities. 
Beauvoir understands objective values to be unconditioned ab-
·solutes and she rejects them, I believe, for two reasons. 
First, her atheism: Without God to guarantee man's existence 
"man will refuse to believe in unconditioned values. 1162 She pre-
supposes God to be the only source of objective values. But since 
God does not exist, she reasons, there are no objective values. At 
this point we have to distinguish two arguments. First, 




God does not exist. 
C Values do not exist. 
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However, for this argument to be a proof, it would have to be proven 
_that values depend on God. Since a proof of this pre..~iss is not 
offered by Beauvoir, all we can use are the following two premisses: 
(1) ~f God existed, values a11d all else would depend on Him. 
(2) God does not exist. But these premisses do not yield the con-
clusion, Values do not exist. (We are not at all concerned with the 
proof for the second premiss. All we want to show is that even if 
one grants the truth of the second premiss, the non.:..existence of 
values is not established.) 
Secondly, Beauvoir's refusal to believe in unconditioned abso-
lutes "which would set themselves athwart his (man's) freedom like 
63 
things," implies that objective values would somehow•limit man's 
freedom. Yet Beauvoir in her discussion on oppression claims that 
things are not oppressive to man's freedom, only other men are. 
Things offer resistance but this resistance sustains human action. 
The object is an obstacle and there is a risk of not conquering it 
but this is not a denial of freedom. The object is the necessary 
condition opposed to freedom by which freedom transcends itself and 
discloses the world. 64 Beauvoir therefore emphatically acknowledges 
that things are not oppressive and yet she seems to think that ob-
jective values would be. However, one might argue in accordance 
with Beauvoir's own thesis that objective values are not oppressive 
63 
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64Ib.d --=---·, pp. 81-82. 
p. 14 
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to man's freedom. Although they offer resistance, this resistance 
sustains moral action. Objective values are challenges to one's 
freedom and there is a risk of not meeting the demands of objective 
values but this is not a denial of freedom. The objective value 
is the necessary condition opposed to moral fre~dom by which moral 
freedom transcends itself and discloses moral action. Objective 
values therefore may be seen as challenges to one's freedom, not 
as limitations on it. One is not forced to respect them. One has 
the freedom to decide to acknowledge them, to accept them or to re-
ject them. 
It is not however the airn of this thesis to prove whether or 
not there are objective values but to show that Beauvoir acknowledges 
objective values in the sense defined in the Introduction. In her 
denial of objective values on the one hand, Beauvoir tacitly rein-
troduces them on the other. While .Beauvoir explicitly denies ob-
jective values and unconditional moral imperatives, her system implies 
what it denies. And this implication, although it involves a contra-
diction, is what justifies her work as an ethics. 
It is important to note those "absolute values" Beauvoir cites 
as examples; the Church, the Highway, the Cause, the Party, the State, 
the Army, etect:.era. She rightfully claims that these Forms are human 
constructions which have no value in themselves but only insofar as 
they serve man. Many of those who believe that values are objective 
would readily agree with Beauvoir. These Forms are not bearers of 
objective values. Throughout her ethics she points out false sub-
sti:tutes for moral values and rightfully attacks them. 
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While she goes too far in that she rejects together with some 
sham examples of objective values, the whole category of objective 
values, Beauvoir implicitly appeals to true objective mcral values 
as the very foundation of the genuinely moral life; 
the value of the individual 
the value of honesty 
the value of respect 
the value of generosity 
the value of love and compassion 
the value of enlightenment and education 
the value of freedom 
She openly acknowledges the disvalue (evil) of oppression, dishonesty, 
tyranny, ignorance, contempt, injustice, cruelty, hatred and evasion. 
She tacitly acknowledges the existence of these values and disvalues 
and affirms their independence of man's recognition. Her ethics is 
devoted to pointing out the existence of these objective moral values 
and disvalues and she tacitly acknowledges their independence of 
man's opinions or acknowledgement. Of course, one could critically 
ask whether the way Beauvoir speaks of evil does not imply a similar 
contradiction to her denial of values and disvalues as is committed 
by her formulating of unconditional imperatives. 
Although Beauvoir claims that ethics does not offer "recipes" 
and its imperatives are hypothetical, she nevertheless does offer 
unconditional imperatives. Morality requires that: 
(1) "the freedom of other men must be respected 
and they must be helped to free themselves" 
(p. 60) 
(2) "Man must realize himself morally" {p. 70) 
(3) "Man must furnish the ignorant slave with 
the means of transcending his situation 
by means of revolt, to put an end to his 
ignorance" (p. 86) 
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(4) "we must end by abolishing all suppression" 
(p. 89} 
(5) "we must treat each man as an end" (p. 135) 
(6) "we must fight evil" (p. 136) 
(7) "we must treat others as a freedom so that 
his end may be freedom" (p. 142) 
Note that all of these imperatives would become meaningless if one 
were not to acknowledge that the states which they "prescribe" is 
to be preferred to other states regardless of our wishes, desires 
or decisions, i. e. that these states must be acknowledged as ob-
jectively valuable as defined in the introduction. 
Beauvoir's significance as a moral philosopher rests in her 
demasking of what one might call "false" moral values. She has ex-
plicitly denied false substitutes for morality and in the effort 
she has replaced them with true ethical values without, of course, 
openly acknowledging their objectivity. 
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